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In December 2005, the EU-25 adopted the new Strategy for Africa, based on the Millennium Development Goals. 
Keeping the commitments requires the new member states and re-emerging donors to adapt their development 
tools and policies. They are rediscovering the African continent, which has not been part of their foreign policy 
priorities since 1989. Indeed, the older member states have long experiences in development assistance to Africa: 
how can they transfer their expertise to the new member states within the European framework? Having learnt 
from their recent democratic and economic transitions, to what extent can the new member states contribute to 
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The fall of the Iron Curtain brought Central and 
Eastern Europe back to the international scene in 
the 1990s. This period also corresponded with 
“aid fatigue” and “Africa’s effacement”. Soon the 
former satellites of the Soviet Union joined the 
OECD and entered the European Union, the 
largest donor to poor countries in the world. 
Having accepted the acquis communautaire, the 
new member states are challenged to take an 
active part in the definition and implementation 
of the common development policy. Their status 
has changed from aid recipient to aid donor.  
If there are still some reasons for afro-pessimism, 
they are nourished by worries that many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa will not achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
by 2015. In fact, Africa is the only region in the 
world where poverty has progressed since 1990. 
Today, almost one African out of two lives on 
less than one euro a day. Two out of five do not 
have access to improved water supply, and 
2.4 million Africans die from HIV/AIDS every 
year. 
At the same time, there are many promising 
signs. Africa is a young continent with 
indisputable economic potential. Recent growth 
of 5%, supported by the rise in prices of raw 
materials and oil, can open the way for 
sustainable development, provided it is based on 
diversified production and trade. At the political 
level, many countries are on the track of 
democratisation, and the continent is taking the 
resolution of internal conflicts in its own hands. 
Some North African countries and South Africa 
are lively centres of development and might help 
to spread development to the rest of Africa. 
In this context, the European Union published 
the “EU Strategy for Africa” in December 2005. 
There are still many unanswered questions on its 
implementation, particularly regarding the 
involvement of the new member states, financing 
and the coordination of the common policy on 
Africa at various levels of intervention. The 
enlarged European Union is engaged in assisting 
African countries in their fight against poverty. It 
has to keep its promise to Africans to retain 
credibility in their eyes. 
What future for Africa?  
Europe and the “Others” 
Africa lays at the heart of strategic interests: its 
naturals resources are coveted by the emerging 
powers of the South such as China and India. 
South Africa has confirmed its role as a regional 
power. Transnational corporations and 
international organisations form another piece of 
the image. This new international context is 
weakening the position of the European Union in 
Africa. 
Can Africa profit from this new competition? The 
answer is unclear. South-South relations bring 
new export opportunities for African countries, 
which among other things benefit from the rise in 
prices of raw materials and see their terms of 
trade improving. Yet it does not go in hand with 
the diversification of production. Africa risks 
remaining a supplier of raw materials to the rest 
of the world. At the political level, new alliances 
are appearing and threaten the values promoted 
by the European Union. 
Among the emerging powers, China’s weight is 
growing on the continent. Its share in African 
trade has grown by 40% every year since 2000, 
reaching 40 billion US dollars in 2005, thus 
surpassing the United Kingdom. As China is 
concerned with new sources of supply, its 
investments mainly target the oil extraction 
sector. A month after the EU, China released its 
own global strategy on Africa, differing from the 
European’s one in several ways: China 
accentuates its lack of colonial history and, in the 
name of non-interference, imposes no aid or 
“The European Union has to take into account that it is not the only global actor  
on Africa’s soil, it meets competitors like China and the United States” 
Luboš Kropáček, Professor at Charles University, Prague 
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investment conditions related to good 
governance or human rights. Deepening ties with 
Zimbabwe and Sudan, banned by the European 
Union, are revealing.  
 
The originality of Europe’s approach to Africa 
lies in its global dimension, which links aid to 
trade, security and environment protection. In 
contrast with the United States, which promotes 
“transformational development”, the European 
Union holds the concept of “sustainable 
development”. Africa’s development is not 
merely a goal in its own right but implies global 
economic, social and environmental stability. 
The new EU member states and Africa: 
strangers or neighbours?  
Relations between Central and East European 
(CEE) countries and Africa cannot be fully 
compared to the historical tights between the 
European powers and their former colonies. This, 
however, does not impede development 
assistance: Scandinavian donors prove that 
historical ties are not a sine qua non condition in 
the matter. 
Furthermore, most of the CEE countries had 
commercial, technological and military relations 
with African countries during the socialist era. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for instance, gave 
nearly one percent of their GDPs to countries “on 
the road to socialism” like Angola and Ethiopia. 
Thousands of African students graduated at 
universities in Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the new member states may want to avoid 
referring to the ideology-laden assistance which 
started in the 1960s, it represents a foundation on 
which they can build on, at least by using 
existing networks. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the new member states immersed themselves in 
their own political, economic and social 
transitions, abruptly abandoning the African 
continent. Trade relations between the CEE 
countries and Africa remain weak with the 
exceptions of Egypt and South Africa. Diplomatic 
relations weakened in the case of the Czech 
Republic, which closed its missions in Abidjan 
and Dakar. Slovenia holds one mission in Africa, 
while Estonia will open its first in Egypt. In 
academia, the attention paid to African studies 
fell. 
The CEE countries reengaged with development 
issues in the second half of the 1990s. The 
development agenda logically focused on their 
neighbours, mainly those in the Balkans, former-
USSR (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), and socialist 
countries in South-East Asia (Vietnam). The CEE 
countries tend to spread their political, economic, 
institutional and social experiences of transition. 
Consequently, among the priority recipient 
countries, the Czech Republic counts only two 
African countries out of eight, Hungary one of 
fifteen, Slovakia three of twelve, Poland one out 
of six, an Estonia and Lithuania none.  
Even though the so-called re-emerging donors 
aspire to OECD Development Assistance 
Committee membership, their GDPs remain low 
despite strong economic growth, limiting their 
contribution to the common development policy. 
Their strategic priorities are aimed at their 
eastern neighbours, while their presence on the 
African continent is quite marginal. 
However, the growing interest of the new 
member states in Africa is linked to the 
metamorphosis in local public opinions. Polls 
show that the population is clearly in favour of 
development policy albeit in slightly lower 
proportions compared with their Western 
neighbours. Nevertheless, citizens are under-
informed about development, suggesting a need 
for public awareness campaigns. Media actions 
“In Africa, many European donors cooperate more intensely with other donors  
such as the United States, Japan and Canada than among themselves.  
At the same time, the new member states are practically absent” 
Paweł Baginski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw 
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and projects lead by CEE development NGOs in 
Africa naturally tend to have a positive impact. 
The new member states face a major challenge to 
reply to bottom-up citizens’ initiatives with a 
governmental top-down policy. Indeed, some 
CEE countries still lack a legislative framework 
for the development agenda. The Czech case is 
even more complex because such competences 
are divided between nine ministries. In sum, 
harmonisation, coordination and cohesion at the 
national level are necessary conditions for the 
better integration of CEE countries in the EU’s 
development policy. 
What lessons remain for Africa from the 
CEE transitions? 
What lessons can Africa learn from Central 
Europe’s transitions? Beyond the diversity of 
their post-socialist trajectories, many aspects 
differ between the current situation in Africa and 
that in CEE in recent years. CEE inherited a stock 
of physical and human capital clearly superior to 
that in Africa. Among other things, the CEE 
transitions were not limited to economic reforms 
but included also political ones. In fact, the 
transition was initiated by a popular will to end 
the totalitarian regimes. 
This thirst for change opened a window of 
opportunity for the so called “extraordinary 
politics”, which allowed new governments, with 
a strong democratic legitimacy, to undertake 
reforms with high social costs. This is an 
additional limit to the transposition of the CEE 
experience to Africa. Last but not least, most of 
the new member states had democratic 
experiences before soviet domination. Africa’s 
history is very different, and as such the South-
East Asian experience seems more relevant. 
While the CEE experience is not directly 
applicable to Africa, the continent can still draw 
some inspiration from the good practice of the 
transition there. Thus, beyond the specific case of 
Poland, successful transitions have prioritised the 
importance of the institutional framework in 
their implementation, mostly in the way it 
guarantees the rights of small businesses: the key 
to economic takeoff.  
Finally, the prospect of EU membership played a 
key role for the CEE countries. Could any 
political project mobilise Africa to the same 
extent? NEPAD alone is insufficient for the task. 
So what kind of partnership can the European 
Union offer to Africa? This calls for a 
reinforcement of the political dialogue between 
both continents. 
In sum, the CEE countries acquired a unique 
experience. In the quest for better governance, 
they can contribute valuable advice in the 
promotion of civil society, human rights, 
decentralisation and regional integration. During 
integration into the European Union, they 
acquired experience in negotiating asymmetric 
trade agreements, which would be valuable for 
African countries, especially the less developed 
ones. In the medium- and long-term, peace and 
security could become a domain of their 
expertise: the Polish armed forces will soon be 
deployed in Congo-Kinshasa. 
New solutions to the instability of 
development financing 
Poverty will never be significantly reduced if the 
developed countries continue to dishonouring 
the commitments they themselves made. If they 
had respected the UN’s recommendations and 
dedicated 0.7% of their GDPs to the fight against 
poverty since 1970, developing countries would 
benefit to the tune of 2.5 trillion US dollars. 
Today only four EU countries of twenty-five 
meet the 0.7% criteria. 
The old member states of the European Union 
declared that they would increase their Official 
“South-East Asia proves democracy is not a necessary condition for development,  
but development leads to democracy” 
Jean-Luc Maurer, President of EADI, Geneva 
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Development Aid allocation from GNI to 0.56 in 
2010 and 0.70% in 2015. On their part, the new 
member states should increase aid to 0.17% and 
0.33% respectively by those dates. More than a 
half of the increase should go to Africa. Yet the 
medium-term forecasts for some CEE countries 
show that these objectives will not be met. As 
well as the sustainable development agenda, the 
international development agenda remains on 
the sidelines of governmental priorities, 
becoming an object of adverse trade-offs when 
budgets are tight. 
The aid budget is not the only decisive factor. Its 
stability and expectedness must also be secured 
because aid volatility can generate macro-
economic shocks, limiting policy planning, and 
thus damaging the absorptive capacity of the 
recipient countries. To meet this aim, tasks on 
three distinct fronts have to be undertaken. Two 
overhang the European framework: debt relief 
and the implementation of new financing 
schemes. The third concerns reform of the 
European Development Fund. 
Last July, the G8 Summit at Gleneagles seemed to 
mark the “end of history”: debt cancellation took 
the place of debt relief in the discourse of heads of 
states. Seventeen Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries, of whom fourteen are in Africa, 
qualified for the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, representing some 37 billion US dollars 
over 40 years. Multilateral debt reduction was 
followed by bilateral creditors including the new 
member states of the European Union. 
Furthermore, the debt relief became an increase 
in public pro-poor expenditures in qualifying 
countries. 
Nevertheless, debt relief begs many questions 
about equity and effectiveness. Countries like 
Poland, Argentina and Mexico, relatively rich 
compared to sub-Saharan Africa, have already 
benefited from substantial debt relief. Yet 
countries that carefully attended to their debts, 
like Hungary, were de facto deceived. However, 
the tsunami in South-East Asia proved that 
indebted countries may be led to refuse offers of 
relief from worries that acceptance would 
prevent them from accessing international 
capital. Debt reduction forms vary from “dry 
relief” to more sophisticated methods of 
conditionality that secure spending in favour of 
poverty reduction. In this case, the effects of debt 
relief are similar to direct aid.  
Creditors’ goodwill can also be challenged. In 
fact, clearing debt is a comfortable solution given 
that the debts are often unsustainable; it also 
gives creditors a positive image. Moreover, in 
some countries the debt service has already 
surpassed the amount of the initial loan, often 
conceded to non-democratic, corrupt 
governments. Indebted countries worried that 
debt relief would supplant aid in the form of 
grants and thus negate the principle of aid 
additionality. However, the increase in total aid 
during recent years cannot entirely be attributed 
to debt relief. Nevertheless, this increase is still 
far from meeting their needs. 
To respond to this challenge, the 60th UN 
General Assembly prepared a declaration on new 
financial instruments, signed by 79 countries. The 
EU’s new member states were represented only 
by Estonia. Among the new instruments, the 
International Financial Facility should allow 
developing countries to borrow the missing 
“An additional 50 to 70 billion US dollars of development assistance is needed to meet  
the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, which means to double current streams“ 
Corso Bavagnoli, Ministry of Economy, Paris  
 
“Cutting debt is not a panacea, but meeting the MDGs without debt cancellation 
would be like travelling to the Moon without a space shuttle” 
Tomáš Tožička, Ecumenical Academy, Prague 
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50 billion US dollars promised by developed 
countries. The IFF should be up and running 
from 2007. A second tool supported by 13 
countries emerged from a common initiative 
from France and Brazil. Consisting in a tax on 
airplane tickets, it should bring in 200 million 
euros a year for the fight against pandemics 
ravaging Africa (HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TBC). 
Other proposals, such as the Tobin tax on 
speculative capital movement, gained less 
success. 
The European Development Fund (EDF) is an 
interface between the financial and managerial 
aspects of development assistance. The main task 
of the tool is to implement the Cotonou 
Agreement, which regulate the relations of the 
European Union with 78 countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The EDF is 
planned on a five-year basis; the 9th program 
will implement 13.5 billion euros with 10 billion 
euros accumulated in residues. Until now,  
the EU Council has rejected the proposal in 
favour of budgetisation, and decided to 
programme the 10th EDF. For the first time, it 
will include the participation of the new member 
states. The major part of the 23 billion euros 
funding will be apportioned to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Arguments in favour of budgetisation are 
convincing. The EDF is a remnant of the colonial 
era. Its inclusion in the EU budget would make it 
more transparent and would submit it to the 
democratic checks ensured by the European 
Parliament, traditionally sensitive to 
development issues. On the administrative level, 
the amount of residues makes weak ACP 
countries’ absorptive capacities evident. EDF 
programming over seven years, instead of five, 
would also offer more flexibility. 
A number of member states definitely resist the 
budgetisation of the EDF. This is the case of the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and 
the new member states. Only Poland’s position 
has been more open. These countries do not want 
to increase their contributions to the EDF equal to 
their contributions to the EU budget. The debate 
on the EDF’s budgetisation reflects incoherence 
between member states’ particular interests on 
the one hand and the implementation of the 
common development policy on the other.  
Beyond aid: trade, health and security 
Development aid is undoubtedly the most visible 
side of Euro-African relations. However, aid 
alone would not permit Africa’s takeoff: the 
continent needs to fully enter into the globalised 
world while its potential growth must not be 
threatened by pandemics and military conflicts. 
Does the European Union sufficiently take these 
conditions into account when defining and 
implementing its foreign policy? 
Trade liberalisation is currently negotiated 
multilaterally within the Doha Round of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) talks. Its aim is to 
remove trade barriers and thus support the 
growth of the world economy and facilitate the 
economic takeoff in developing countries. Yet 
countries in the South have not profited from 
“The programming of the 10th EDF is an occasion to develop common strategies  
and to introduce the division of labour in EU action, including the possibility  
for the new member states to choose countries and sectors which interest them” 
Philippe Etienne, Director General of the DGCID, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris 
 
”Most important for the new member states is not to sign a cheque to the EDF; moreover, we should 
make sure that Hungarian NGOs and companies build capacities to be able to respond to calls for 
projects. That would generate new relationships with ACP countries” 
Lázsló Vizi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest 
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globalisation and trade liberalisation equally. The 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are facing 
strong competition from emerging powers such 
as China, India and Brazil. The diversification in 
the South makes full North-South liberalisation 
problematic and even harmful: it would make 
the poorer countries more vulnerable. Their 
openness to international competition should 
hence be compensated by assisting the trade 
sector. The old question “aid or trade” has a 
relevant answer “aid for trade”. 
Having accepted this view, in 2001 the European 
Union gave 50 Least Developed Countries wide 
access to the European market in the framework 
of the “Everything but Arms” initiative, which 
makes part of the Global System of Preferences. 
Nevertheless, the initiative has not so far helped 
ACP countries to reverse their worsening 
position in world trade. In fact, these countries’ 
export skills are so weak that they cannot fully 
profit from customs and quota exemptions 
conceded by the European Union for their 
products. At the same time, traditional sectors in 
Africa such as textile and agriculture are 
threatened by competition from the emerging 
powers of the South, which put pressure on the 
liberalisation of those sectors where they hold a 
strong comparative advantage. The frequently 
discussed reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, including a progressive cut of export 
subsidies on European products, will not be 
sufficient to ensure the takeoff of the less 
developed countries. 
Taking into account the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Global System of 
Preferences in opening African markets, the 
reciprocal liberalisation presumed by the 
Economic Partnership Agreements, linking the 
European Union with ACP countries, will 
proceed in three steps: within a regional group, 
then between different Southern markets, and 
finally between North and South. A win-win 
situation requires, amongst other things, that the 
European Union and the rest of the international 
community keep the commitments on increasing 
aid in favour of the most vulnerable sectors, 
especially agriculture. Eventually, special 
attention must be paid to compensate losses in 
customs earnings and the weakening capacity of 
African countries to overcome non-tariff barriers.  
The economic takeoff of South-East Asia did not 
only show that a specific dose of initial 
protectionism can be efficient, but also that health 
and education are sine qua non conditions of 
development. However, the health sector has 
been neglected by international donors. In the 
past, health was often sacrificed in the 
framework of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programs, implemented under 
pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, health expenditure per capita 
is 80 times less than in OECD countries. 
Moreover, as general health insurance is missing, 
60% of spending is charged directly to 
households. 
According to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), financial assistance provided for health 
services should be multiplied by eight. The link 
between poverty and bad health is strong: 
according to the WHO, every year 80 million of 
people suffer from “catastrophic” health 
expenditures, representing more than 40% of the 
household budget. The situation is particularly 
bad regarding the pandemics ravaging the 
continent (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria). 
In countries with prevalence exceeding 5%, 
HIV/AIDS completely annihilated the slow 
advancement in life expectancy since the 1950s. 
The disease then became a major obstacle to 
economic development in Africa. The creation of 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria in 2002 manifests the growing 
international awareness regarding the 
seriousness of the problem. 
“We have to be sure that aid outcomes do not create dependency and complaisance, 
 but actually help to promote trade competitiveness” 
Chiedu Osakwe, WTO Secretariat, Geneva 
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However, in spite of the progress recorded in 
recent years, universal access to anti-retroviral 
treatment (ARV) still remains a distant prospect. 
This defeat is evident through the failure of the 
“3 by 5” initiative, which aimed to treat 3 million 
patients by 2005. According to the WHO, only 
810,000 of 4.7 million infected individuals in 
urgent need of ARV treatment in sub-Saharan 
Africa were treated by the end of 2005. 
Security, here discussed in its narrow meaning, is 
the last condition of the development. During 
recent years, the world witnessed the growing 
involvement of African countries in conflict 
resolution on the continent. The taking 
responsibility for internal problems is a very 
positive signal, as shown by the dispatch of 
African Union troops to Darfur. 
This new trend challenges the use of the EU’s 
foreign policy budget. In fact, 250 million euros 
from the ninth application of the EDF were 
earmarked for ACP countries to support security, 
35 million of which were earmarked for regional 
conflict prevention programmes and training. 
Europe should strengthen cooperation with the 
United Nations, whose mandate remains the only 
guarantee of international legitimacy in case of 
an external intervention. Finally, NGOs should 
be more intensely involved in conflict 
prevention. 
The WTO-lead liberalisation, the fight against 
pandemics like HIV/AIDS and the conflict 
prevention programmes all require more aid. 
Insufficient action in each of the three can 
invalidate advancements in the others. 
Managing the diversity 
of actors and instruments 
In current use by development practitioners, 
“Africa” is often a synonym for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Nonetheless, in the North of the 
continent, the countries of the Maghreb have 
strong chances of reaching the MDGs. In the 
South of the continent, a regional power is being 
confirmed. In any case, Africa cannot be 
considered a homogeneous block. 
Moreover, the diversity of development aid 
instruments is multiplied by the diversity of 
actors intervening at various levels. The EU’s 
development policy is thus situated between that 
of its member states and that of multilateral 
institutions. In contrast to the WTO, where the 
European Union speaks in a single voice through 
the Trade Commissioner, in other multilateral 
institutions like the UN, the IMF and the World 
Bank, the voice of the European Union as such is 
less audible. However, its weight in the UN is 
prevailing in terms of financing: 38% of the UN 
budget is paid by the EU, which leads more than 
40% of UN peacekeeping operations. More than 
60% of development aid distributed to Africa by 
the UN is provided by the EU.                                   
Regarding the United Nations, the European 
Union may choose from three possible modus 
vivendi. First is to facilitate concord between 
members states and pressure the international 
consensus (Kyoto Protocol, Johannesburg 
Summit), although there can be difficulties 
converging member states’ positions, as the Iraq 
War attests. Second is to intervene as a regional 
organisation with a Security Council mandate 
(the Kosovo interim administration, police 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
Middle East Quartet). The African case is 
different, as evidenced by the isolated 
interventions of the United Kingdom in Sierra 
Leone and France in Côte d’Ivoire—at least in the 
beginning. Finally, the European Union can act as 
an international player, but its development 
interventions might weaken the UNDP’s 
presumed coordination role. 
A smart mix of the three options available to the 
EU could empower both international and 
“We need a massive investment in the health sector; it represents a strategic objective, 
a condition accompanying economic growth”  
Jean-Paul Moatti, Professor of medicine and director of an INSERM Research Unit, Marseille 
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regional organisations, especially the African 
Union. The EU’s Strategy for Africa, adopted in 
December 2005, represents progress in reaching a 
European consensus, but a single European voice 
is still absent in other areas. 
This strategy could also be fruitful vis-à-vis other 
powers. The growing influence of China in Africa 
has already been underlined. China undermines 
the efforts of the European Union and 
international organisations in promoting 
democracy and good governance on the 
continent. The United States prefers a largely 
bilateral approach to global consensus as shown 
by the recent implementation of the “Millennium 
Challenge Corporation”. A reinforced dialogue 
with both actors, and more generally with the 
G24, seems necessary. It is also important to note 
that important donors such as Switzerland and 
Norway are not EU members. This means aid 
will continue to be coordinated on an ad hoc basis. 
In this particular case, the OECD remains the best 
platform for promoting the values of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
Regarding the EU members states, subsidiarity 
and the 3C principle (complementarity, 
coordination and coherency) of the EU’s 
development policy must be respected. To be 
more efficient, member states’ bilateral projects 
need to be complementary, coordinated in the 
way that all countries and sectors are covered, 
and mutually coherent with common 
agricultural, trade, security and environmental 
policies. The EU’s ambition to act as an aid 
coordinator and donor at the same time does not 
facilitate this task, but a joint strategy can 
strengthen its visibility on the international 
scene. 
One of the main lessons learned from the history 
of development assistance concerns the emphasis 
on the ownership of development by recipient 
countries, mainly via their participation in the 
choice of aid objectives. Europe should not 
elaborate a strategy for Africa but engage in a 
genuine partnership with Africa. To do so, do 
Africa and the European Union share a common 
vision of the continent’s future? 
The ownership of the development cooperation is 
not merely a challenge for partner countries. 
Donor states are concerned, too. Indeed, in the 
case of the new member states, the part of the aid 
delivered through the EU budget varies from 
one-half for the Czech Republic to two thirds for 
Estonia. However, are Czech or Estonian citizens 
aware of EU development activities? Do they 
identify themselves with its development policy?  
More information dissemination, media and 
public awareness campaigns are needed to 
accomplish the ownership of the common 
development policy by European citizens. This 
task is made more urgent by the fact that the 
development ranges between the most popular 
policies of the European Union. 
“It is in its diversity that the European Union can find its comparative advantages 
 in development assistance, compared to other regional organisations“ 
Vincent Géronimi, President of GEMDEV, Paris  
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Recommendations for the implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa
Build the capacities of the new EU member states  
 
 Traditionally oriented in their development 
policy towards transition countries in Eastern 
Europe (Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) and 
in the Balkans, the new member states have to 
find a compromise in their strategic 
priorities with Africa, where most of the 
countries lagging in the MDG achievements 
are situated. 
 Promote the implementation of trilateral 
projects associating the new member states 
with more experienced ones. As the limited 
budgets of the new member states make direct 
and sectoral aid inappropriate, they should 
engage more intensely in multilateral 
programmes. 
 To support the civil society to take ownership 
of the common development policy, the 
European Union should strengthen the 
capacities of NGOs and companies in the 
new member states to allow them to 
participate in the implementation of European 
projects. 
 Intensify information dissemination, public 
awareness and media campaigns about the 
EU’s development policy. 
  
Translate Central and Eastern Europe’s 
experiences of political and economic transition 
in concrete projects  
 
 Strengthen the strategic partnership with 
Africa to motivate African countries in a 
manner similar to the way the prospect of 
European Union accession motivated the new 
member states. 
 Learn from the experience of asymmetric 
trade agreements with the European Union 
and assist African countries in developing 
negotiation skills. 
 Promote good practices for transition, 
particularly in governance, inspired by the 
transfers of experience already enacted by the 
new member states in CIS and Balkan 
countries, while making sure of their 
applicability to Africa’s problems. 
 
Secure the scope of stable financial instruments 
at the level of fixed objectives 
 
 Keep to the committed aid increases as per 
the aims the European Union fixed in 2005, 
and secure aid expectedness and the stability 
of financial flows in the long term. 
 Ensure the complementarity of new sources 
of financing and their earmarking, especially 
in the fight against pandemics ravaging Africa 
(HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria) requiring 
massive investment in health sector. 
 Invite the re-emerging donors to join the UN 
initiative on new sources of development 
financing and consider the adhesion to the 
initiative on air bill tax. 
 
Strengthen the complementarity, coordination 
and coherency of European policies towards 
Africa 
 
 Promote the complementarity and division 
of labour at the European and bilateral levels 
between old and new member states. 
 Counter the negative effects of world trade 
liberalisation through assistance to 
vulnerable sectors (especially agriculture) in 
less developed countries and support the 
diversification of African production and 
exports. 
 Improve aid coordination with other 
multilateral actors and big powers, either 
traditional (USA) or emerging (China, India 
and Brazil). 
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